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Abstract
Scientists pursue collective knowledge, but they also seek personal
recognition from their peers. When scientists decide whether or not to
work on a big new problem, they weigh the potential rewards of a major
discovery against the costs of setting aside other projects. These self-
interested decisions may distribute researchers across problems in an effi-
cient manner, but efficiency is not guaranteed. We use simple economic
models to understand such decisions and their collective consequences.
Academic science differs from industrial R&D in that academics often
share partial solutions to gain reputation. This convention of Open Sci-
ence is thought to accelerate collective discovery, but we find that it need
not do so. The ability to share partial results influences which scientists
work on a particular problem; consequently, Open Science can slow down
the solution of a problem if it deters entry by important actors.
1 Introduction
In the development of a scientific field, problems arise that are widely recognized
as important. Their solutions may be critical to progress in the field, valuable
to society, or both. Faced with such a problem, researchers in the field must
make a choice: should they continue pursuing their workaday lines of inquiry, or
should they join the race to solve the problem? This is a strategic decision, since
an individual scientist’s best choice depends on the choices of other researchers.
∗All authors contributed equally to this paper. This work was supported by a generous
grant to the Metaknowledge Network from the John Templeton Foundation.
1
A problem worth pursuing in the absence of competition may be a bad bet if
several top research teams are racing for the solution.
This decision has both personal and societal consequences. An individual
scientist can obtain considerable prestige by solving a recognized important
problem, but she will have wasted precious research effort should she be beaten
to the solution by a competitor. For problems with significant social impact,
society can benefit when many scientists join the race and as a result the problem
is rapidly solved. On the other hand, it can be wasteful if too many scientists
pursue a single problem in parallel, because too much effort is diverted away
from other research activity.
There is no a priori reason why strategic individual behavior should gener-
ate socially optimal outcomes. If we want to understand the conditions under
which scientific institutions support more or less efficient allocations of cogni-
tive labor (Kitcher, 1990), we need a model in which aggregate behavior arises
from individual allocation decisions—decisions made in response to incentives,
given preferences over time and risk. This approach naturally falls into a do-
main sometimes dubbed the “new” economics of science (Dasgupta and David,
1994; Stephan, 1996). Building on early contributions by seminal figures such
as Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), this research program emphasizes the
analysis of distinctive scientific institutions; draws explicitly on classic con-
tributions from the sociology of science (Merton, 1957a, 1968, 1973; Latour,
1987); and uses a variety of game theoretic models to analyze distinct steps
in the production of scientific and technical knowledge, from problem choice
(Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987) to the timing of research (Dasgupta, 1988) to
information sharing (Dasgupta and David, 1987).
We draw here on two other streams of literature, in addition to the new
economics of science discussed above. One stream comes from the philosophy of
science, and the other comes from the microeconomic study of patenting. The
philosophy stream has its roots in early work by Peirce (1897), and tries to un-
derstand how apparently idiosyncratic features of the scientific credit systems
lead to more or less efficient allocations of scientists to problems (Kitcher, 1995;
Strevens, 2003, 2006, 2011). Within this stream, researchers have used a variety
of formal models to analyze distinct steps in the production of scientific and tech-
nical knowledge, from problem choice (Kleinberg and Oren, 2011) to the timing
of research, to team formation (Bikard et al., 2015; Boyer-Kassem and Imbert,
2015), to information sharing norms (Zollman, 2009).
Here we build specifically on Kleinberg and Oren (2011). These authors
find that seemingly unfair aspects of credit allocation like the Matthew effect
(Merton, 1968) can support an efficient distribution of scientists across prob-
lems. However, they also demonstrate that there are generic cases in which the
credit system possesses insufficient degrees of freedom to impel socially efficient
outcomes. But their model is atemporal; thus it cannot be used for treating
decisions about when to publish, nor can it be readily extended to account for
time preferences on the part of scientists or of planners. As we will see, ac-
counting for time preferences will be important in a nuanced analysis of social
welfare and efficiency. Moreover, heterogeneity in scientists’ time preferences
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can further reduce the prospects for socially optimal allocations.
By contrast, the relevant microeconomic literature on patenting tackles the
issue of time directly. Early economic models of patent races explore the R&D
investment decisions that firms make in an effort to secure intellectual property
rights (Loury, 1979; Lee and Wilde, 1980); see Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014)
for a contemporary treatment. In these analyses, the patent race is typically
modeled as a symmetric game without ex ante heterogeneity among participants
in competitive ability, opportunity cost, or time preferences. These modeling
decision assure a unique equilibrium.
Building on the initial patent models, later authors focus on the effect
of partial information disclosure. A firm may disclose partial information to
signal its strength and commitment to the race (Anton and Yao, 2003; Gill,
2008), to increase the entire market demand (De Fraja, 1993), to induce exit of
risk-averse competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Lichtman et al., 2000;
Baker and Mezzetti, 2005) or to establish prior art as a defensive measure
(Parchomovsky, 2000).
Like the contributors to this literature, we are concerned with identifying
incentives for sharing valuable information with potential competitors. Because
we are modeling the decisions of academic scientists, however, we allow the dis-
closure of partial results to be rewarding per se: disclosure confers recognition,
which is a foundation of academic science (Merton, 1957a, 1973).
In the past two years, researchers have begun to model how academic pri-
ority races influence decisions about whether to disclose partial results. The
basic tension is the same as we explore here: by publishing partial results, a re-
searcher or research team is assured some credit for the progress already made,
at the cost of ceding any lead in the race to solve the bigger problem. Boyer
(2014) lays out a basic model of this scenario, and finds that in some circum-
stances the risk of losing the larger race to a major finding creates incentives for
researchers to settle for the bird-in-hand, publishing intermediate results and
claiming what credit they can. Banerjee et al. (2014) consider a more compli-
cated model of scientific progress as a “treasure hunt” game in which multiple
alternate paths may lead to the end result. Like Boyer (2014), they find that
researchers will often choose to obtain partial credit by publishing intermediate
findings along the way. Heesen (2015) finds a clever way to depict multi-stage
credit races as an extensive-form game of incomplete information; under certain
symmetry assumptions, sharing all partial results is a unique Nash equilibrium
in his model.
Our analysis diverges from these treatments because we provide the re-
searchers in our model with an outside option: we allow them to opt in or out of
the focal problem. This is important for a several reasons. First, by making par-
ticipation a strategic decision, our model highlights the strategic dependence of
one agent’s payoffs for opting in on the decisions of other agents about whether
to participate as well 1. Second, by allowing scientists to opt in or opt out of
1Oren and Kleinberg are able to capture a similar phenomenon by developing a model in
which researchers can choose among multiple alternative projects.
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the focal problem, we are able to make explicit social welfare comparisons with
regard to the under- or over-allocation of scientists to given problems. Third,
our approach captures strategic complexities that recommend against maximal
information sharing. When everyone has to opt in, sharing obviously acceler-
ates the solution of the full problem. Information sharing becomes strategically
interesting once individuals can opt out; different sharing rules have different
consequences for who participates in each stage. For example, when scientists
are able to share partial results, certain individuals might drop out of the race
once the easy stages have been completed, whereas they would have stayed to
the end if only the complete solution had been publishable. Thus it is far from
trivial whether information sharing will accelerate overall progress on the focal
problem.
In this paper, we describe a formal model of scientific decision-making by
scientists who act as self-interested strategic agents rather than idealized seekers
of knowledge2. In this model, scientists choose whether to forego the rewards
of their everyday research and enter a race to solve an important focal prob-
lem. We show that this game has a unique risk-dominant equilibrium under
reasonable assumptions and demonstrate that the existence of this equilibrium
is robust to heterogeneity among scientists in scientific capital. We then extend
the model to allow the publication of partial results. We provide a framework
for teasing apart scientists’ incentives from society’s outcomes. We demonstrate
that the institution of Open Science (i.e., the publication of partial results) is
not universally beneficial, because it can slow the time to solution for important
problems and thereby decrease social welfare.
2 Model setup
Our primary goal is to understand scientists’ decision to participate in a race to
solve a commonly acknowledged, widely valued problem P . We hence consider
the set of all scientists I = {1, 2, · · · , N} that could conceivably work on this
focal problem. Time t is continuous. At t = 0 the existence and importance of
the problem becomes common knowledge. In practice, this big problem could
arise in many ways: the development of an enabling technique or technology
(e.g., CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing technology allowing us to develop gene drive
systems to eliminate mosquito malaria vectors; Hammond et al. (2016)); the
sudden emergence of a socially-relevant challenge (e.g., the AIDS epidemic of
the 1980’s and the need to identify its etiological agent; Epstein (1996)); or
the pressure to resolve contradictory lines of evidence or an embarrassment of
accumulating anomalies (Kuhn, 2012), with examples ranging from the role of
persistent antigen in preserving immunological memory (Antia et al., 1998) to
2This approach shares much with the picture arising from ethnographic and historical
work within science studies (Bourdieu, 1975; Panofsky, 2014; Latour, 1987). By connecting
formal methods with such qualitative analyses, we can provide science studies with formal
microfoundations, and ground the modeling work of economists and philosophers in the finely
textured observation of practicing scientists.
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the Lamb shift in the energy levels of hydrogen, which stimulated the develop-
ment of quantum electrodynamics (Schweber, 1994). In the simplest case, we
assume that scientists have a single opportunity to opt in; if a scientist does
not participate at t = 0, she cannot participate at any point later in time (we
will relax this assumption subsequently). To participate, scientists must make
an initial outlay F > 0, representing the time needed to master any relevant
techniques and/or the funds required to equip or staff the lab to pursue problem
P . We assume that this outlay is the same across scientists.
We will model scientists’ decisions to work on problems that, while univer-
sally acknowledged as important, do not have a known method of solution and
hence require more than rote effort. We capture this feature of the problem
through the distribution of the time to solution τi. We assume that τi follows
an exponential distribution3:
Prob(τi ≤ t) = 1− e
−
hi
d
t.
Scientists differ in their intrinsic ability to make progress on the focal prob-
lem and in the amount of capital (material, financial, human, social) they can
bring to bear. We capture this difference with an scientist-specific parameter hi
quantifying i’s scientific capital. Problems also vary in their intrinsic difficulty;
we capture this variation in the difficulty of the focal problem with a parameter
d. A scientist’s instantaneous probability of solving the focal problem is thus
hi
d
. All else being equal, problems with higher d will take longer to solve, and
scientists with lower hi will take longer to solve them. We assume common
knowledge of these parameters.
Under the priority rule, the first scientist to solve the problem gets a fixed
payoff V > 0 (but see Merton (1968); Strevens (2003, 2006)) and her unsuc-
cessful competitors in the race get nothing. Racing to solve the focal problem
diverts researchers from their usual work. Therefore, participants in the race
incur an opportunity cost of x per unit of scientific capital per unit time, i.e.,
if researcher i works on P for time t she will pay an opportunity cost hi x t.
We assume in this simplest case that x is the same across all scientists and
that there is no time-discount of payoffs, although we will relax both of these
assumptions subsequently.
If a scientist chooses not to participate, she gets a payoff of 0. A scientist will
only benefit from participation if her instantaneous return from participation
is positive, i.e., V hi
d
− hi x > 0; but because of the fixed cost this not a suffi-
cient condition for participation. Given this, continuing to participate until the
problem is solved strictly dominates any strategy with an earlier exit, because
if one stops early, one gets an instantaneous return of 0. Therefore we only
consider strategies in which scientists persist until a problem is solved. Now we
can easily compute the expected payoff of any scientist i who does participate.
Let I ′ ⊂ I denote the set of participating scientists. Then hI′ =
∑
j∈I′ hj is the
total scientific capital of all participating scientists and hI′−i =
∑
j∈I′,j 6=i hj is
3Huber (1998, 2001; cf. Heesen 2015) shows that patents and papers are distributed across
a career in a manner consistent with an exponential distribution of times-to-solution.
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the total scientific capital of all of i’s competitors. Given an exponential dis-
tribution of solution times, i solves the problem with probability hi
hI′
and the
expected time to solution is d
hI′
. Thus, the expected payoff to i of participation
is
Ui(I
′, hi, hI′−i) = V
hi
hI′
− hi x
d
hI′
− F
We define an equilibrium of this game as a subset of participating scientists
I∗ ⊂ I such that
Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ I
∗
Uj(I
∗ + j, hj , hI∗) ≤ 0 for every j /∈ I
∗
This is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., no scientist can unilaterally improve her ex-
pected payoff by altering her decision whether or not to participate. We will
refer to the model described here as the basic game.
3 Results
3.1 Multiple Equilibria and Risk Dominance
As in typical patent race models, a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist.
Unlike much of the patent race literature, our assumption of ex ante variation
in scientific capital means that there are generically multiple equilibria even in
our most basic model. We first prove the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A Nash equilibrium always exists in the basic game.
Proof For notational convenience, we construct the index set I = {1, 2, · · · , N}
such that scientists are labeled in descending order of scientific capital hi: h1 ≥
h2 ≥ · · · ≥ hN . Now let I
∗ = {1, · · · , i∗} where i∗ = max{i : (V
d
− x) dhi∑i
j=1
hj
−
F ≥ 0}, and consider I∗ as the participating group of scientists. Note that for
each scientist i < i∗, her expected payoff from participation is strictly higher
than that of scientist i∗, and hence strictly positive; also by construction of i∗,
if any scientist i > i∗ chose to participate, her expected payoff would be strictly
negative. Therefore, we know that I∗ is an equilibrium. This completes the
proof.
Moreover, there are commonly multiple equilibria in this game.
Example 1 Consider three paleolinguists: Alice, Bob, and Carol. Renowned
scholar Alice has scientific capital ha = 10, whereas mid-career colleague Bob
has scientific capital hb = 5, and early career researcher Carol has hc = 4
respectively. A sequence of symbols from the upper Paleolithic is discovered in
an Australian cave, and the race is on to decode its meaning. The value of
finding the solution is V = 20, the difficulty of the problem is d = 5 and the
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opportunity cost of working on the problem is x = 1 per unit scientific capital
per unit time. In addition, working on the problem incurs an immediate fixed
cost of F = 4 for each scientist.
If Alice and Bob work on the problem, it is not worth it for Carol to enter
because her expected payoff from participation would be negative. If Alice and
Carol work on the problem, Bob will stay out for a similar reason. If Bob and
Carol were to work on the problem, Alice would not stay out; her expected payoff
from participation would be positive. If Alice joins, it would behoove either
Bob or Carol to drop, because either one’s expected payoff from participation
would be negative given that the other stayed. Therefore this game has two
Nash equilibria. In one, the participants are {Alice, Bob} and in the other
{Alice, Carol}.
At first glance, multiple equilibria are problematic: they undercut the pre-
dictive value of the theory. However, intuition suggests that the Alice-Bob equi-
librium is more plausible than the Alice-Carol equilibrium. After all, if Carol
mistakenly enters the Alice-Bob equilibrium, the cost to Carol would be higher
than the cost to Bob if Bob mistakenly enters the Alice-Carol equilibrium; this
is because Carol has less scientific capital than Bob. The same intuition ap-
plies to accidental exit by the scientists participating in an equilibrium: if Bob
mistakenly exits the Alice-Bob equilibrium, the expected loss to Bob (i.e., the
expected payoff that Bob could have earned) would be higher than the expected
loss to Carol if Carol mistakenly exits the Alice-Carol equilibrium.
For two-player games, economists formalize this kind of intuition with the
concept of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). We extend the notion
of risk dominance to n player games (cf. Kojima 2006). Let I∗ \ Iˆ be the set of
scientists in I∗ but not Iˆ. We define an equilibrium I∗ as risk dominant if for
any equilibrium Iˆ, the following inequality holds:
|
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ
Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i)×
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗
Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj, hI∗∪Iˆ−j)|
≥|
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗
Uj(Iˆ , hj, hIˆ−j)×
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ
Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i)|
The first term on the left-hand side,
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i), is the total
loss of the subgroup I∗ \ Iˆ should they play their strategies in Iˆ instead of
their strategies in I∗. In our game, this is the total loss to I∗ \ Iˆ if they
fail to participate when they should have. The second term
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗ Uj(I
∗ ∪
Iˆ , hj, hI∗∪Iˆ−j) is the total loss of the subgroup Iˆ \ I
∗ should they play their
strategies in Iˆ instead of their strategies in I∗. In our game, this is the total
loss to Iˆ \ I∗ if they participate when they should have stayed out. Note that
in both cases the strategies of the other scientists are held constant. The right-
hand side of the inequality can be interpreted in a similar way by flipping the
two equilibria.
We focus on generic cases in which the hi’s are different from one another.
To make the problem non-trivial, we assume that V − dx − F > 0. To avoid
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excessive technicality, we assume that a scientist participates when she is indif-
ferent between participation and non-participation. We thus prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 A risk dominant equilibrium exists and is unique: I∗ = {1, · · · , i∗}
where i∗ = max{i : V hi∑i
j=1
hj
− hi x
d∑
i
j=1
hj
− F ≥ 0}.
Proof From the assumption that V −dx−F > 0 we know that I∗ is not empty;
by construction of i∗ we know that I∗ is an equilibrium.
Now consider any other equilibrium Iˆ 6= I∗. Again by construction of i∗, we
know that both I∗ \ Iˆ and Iˆ \ I∗ are non-empty. Let I∗ \ Iˆ = {i1, · · · , im} and
Iˆ \ I∗ = {j1, · · · , jn}, and re-label the scientists such that hi1 > hi2 > · · · > him
and hj1 > hj2 > · · · > hjn . It immediately follows that im ≥ i
∗ > j1. Also, for
Iˆ to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that m ≤ n.
For notational convenience, let A =
∑
i∈I∗ hi, B =
∑
j∈Iˆ hj , and C =
A+
∑n
p=1 hjp = B +
∑m
q=1 hiq . Let l = |I
∗ ∩ Iˆ|. We discuss two cases: A ≥ B
and A < B.
When A ≥ B: to show that I∗ is the unique risk dominant equilibrium, it
suffices to show that
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ
Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i) >
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗
Uj(Iˆ , hj , hIˆ−j) (1)
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗
Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj, hI∗∪Iˆ−j) <
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ
Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i). (2)
Note that in (2), the term on either side has a negative value.
To prove (1), we compute the total expected payoff in the two equilibria:
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗, hi, h−i) = V − dx− (m+ l)F
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(Iˆ , hj , h−j) = V − dx− (n+ l)F.
From m ≤ n, we have
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i) >
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(Iˆ , hj , hIˆ−j). (3)
Now, notice that
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(I
∗, hk, hI∗−k) = (
V
d
− x)
d
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ hk
A
− l F
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(Iˆ , hk, hIˆ−k) = (
V
d
− x)
d
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ hk
B
− l F.
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From A ≥ B, we have
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(I
∗, hk, hI∗−k) ≤
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(Iˆ , hk, hI∗−k). (4)
Combining (3) and (4), and noticing that m ≤ n and A ≥ B cannot be binding
at the same time (i.e., at least one of them must be strict), we have the desired
inequality (1).
To prove (2), we write the terms on both sides as
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i) = (
V
d
− x)
dA
C
− (m+ l)F
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj , hI∗∪Iˆ−j) = (
V
d
− x)
dB
C
− (n+ l)F.
Following a similar argument to above, we have
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i) >
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj , hI∗∪Iˆ−j). (5)
Subtracting the term on either side of (5) from the total expected payoff in I∗∪ Iˆ
(which is not an equilibrium), we have the desired inequality (2).
When A < B: to show that I∗ is the unique risk dominant equilibrium, it
suffices to show that
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i)
m
>
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗ Uj(Iˆ , hj , hIˆ−j)
n
(6)
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗ Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj, hI∗∪Iˆ−j)
n
<
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i)
m
. (7)
Note that in (7), the term on either side has a negative value.
Let D =
∑m
q=1 hiq and E =
∑n
p=1 hjp . The above inequalities can be written
as
(
V
d
− x)
D
mA
− F > (
V
d
− x)
E
mB
− F
(
V
d
− x)
E
nC
− F < (
V
d
− x)
D
mC
− F,
which are further equivalent to
D
m
1
A
>
E
n
1
B
(8)
E
n
<
D
m
, (9)
From the assumption A < B, it immediately follows that 1
A
> 1
B
. Also, E
n
< D
m
is guaranteed by im ≥ i
∗ > j1 derived before. Therefore, (8) and (9) are
satisfied, which implies (6) and (7). This completes the proof.
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Thus we expect to see realized the equilibrium in which the researchers with
the highest scientific capital pursue the problem and all other researches stay
out of the race. We demonstrate this by explicit calculation for the previous
example.
Example 2 Consider the two equilibria in Example 1. Let I∗ = {Alice, Bob}
and Iˆ = {Alice, Carol}. It follows that I∗ \ Iˆ = {Bob} and Iˆ \ I∗ = {Carol}.
Then we can calculate the corresponding expected payoffs in the inequality char-
acterizing risk dominance:
|
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ
Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i)×
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗
Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj, hI∗∪Iˆ−j)| = |1× (−0.84)|
≥|
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗
Uj(Iˆ , hj, hIˆ−j)×
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ
Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i)| = |0.29× (−0.05)|
Hence, {Alice, Bob} is the unique risk dominant equilibrium.
3.2 Heterogeneous outside options
The uniqueness of the risk-dominant equilibrium does not require that all play-
ers have the same opportunity cost per unit of scientific capital per unit time.
We demonstrate this as follows. Let the per-unit opportunity cost xi be het-
erogeneous, in the sense that it is a function of hi: xi = χ(hi). In other words,
scientists in our model now have heterogeneous outside options.The total op-
portunity cost per unit time hiχ(hi) is still assumed to be increasing in hi. The
expected payoff of scientist i becomes V hi
hI′
− hiχ(hi)
d
hI′
− F . To make the
problem non-trivial, assume that V − χ(h1) d− F > 0. We prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Let I∗ = {1, · · · , i∗} where i∗ = max{i : V hi∑i
j=1
hj
−hi χ(hi)
d∑
i
j=1
hj
−
F ≥ 0}. I∗ is the unique risk dominant equilibrium if hχ(h) is concave in h
and
hi∗−1 χ(hi∗−1)−hi∗ χ(hi∗ )
hi∗−1−hi∗
< V
d
.
Proof When hχ(h) is concave in h and
hi∗−1 χ(hi∗−1)−hi∗ χ(hi∗ )
hi∗−1−hi∗
< V
d
, the ex-
pected payoff to scientist i ∈ I∗ is decreasing in i. Hence I∗ is indeed an
equilibrium.
To prove that I∗ is the unique risk dominant equilibrium, we adopt the
argument in the proof of Proposition 2 using the same notation. Consider any
other equilibrium Iˆ. It still follows that im ≥ i
∗ > j1 and m ≤ n. As before, we
discuss two cases: A ≥ B and A < B.
When A ≥ B: we aim to prove the same inequalities (1) and (2). To prove
(1), let a =
∑
i∈I∗ hi χ(hi)
A
and b =
∑
j∈Iˆ hj χ(hj)
B
. From the assumption that
hχ(h) is concave, we know that a < b. We then have
∑
i∈I∗ hi χ(hi) = aA and
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∑
j∈Iˆ hj χ(hj) = bB. The total expected payoffs in the two equilibria are given
by
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i) = (V
A
d
−
∑
i∈I∗
hi χ(hi))
d
A
− (m+ l)F = V − a d− (m+ l)F
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(Iˆ , hj , hIˆ−j) = (V
B
d
−
∑
j∈Iˆ
hj χ(hj))
d
B
− (n+ l)F = V − b d− (n+ l)F.
From m ≤ n, we have
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i) >
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(Iˆ , hj , hIˆ−j). (10)
Now, notice that
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(I
∗, hk, hI∗−k) = (V
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ hk
d
−
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
hk χ(hk))
d
A
− l F
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(Iˆ , hk, hIˆ−k) = (V
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ hk
d
−
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
hk χ(hk))
d
B
− l F.
From A ≥ B, we have
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(I
∗, hk, hI∗−k) ≤
∑
k∈I∗∩Iˆ
Uk(Iˆ , hk, hIˆ−k). (11)
Combining (10) and (11), we have the desired inequality (1).
To prove (2), we write the terms on both sides as
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i) = (V
A
d
− aA)
d
C
− (m+ l)F
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj , hI∗∪Iˆ−j) = (V
B
d
− bB)
d
C
− (n+ l)F.
Following a similar argument to above, we have
∑
i∈I∗
Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i) >
∑
j∈Iˆ
Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj , hI∗∪Iˆ−j). (12)
Subtracting the term on either side of (5) from the total expected payoff in I∗∪ Iˆ
(which is not an equilibrium), we have the desired inequality (2).
When A < B: to show that I∗ is the unique risk dominant equilibrium, it
suffices to show that
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ Ui(I
∗, hi, hI∗−i)
m
>
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗ Uj(Iˆ , hj , hIˆ−j)
n
(13)
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗ Uj(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hj , hI∗∪Iˆ−j)
n
<
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ Ui(I
∗ ∪ Iˆ , hi, hI∗∪Iˆ−i)
m
. (14)
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Let a′ =
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ hi χ(hi)
D
and b′ =
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗ hj χ(hj)
E
. From the assumption that
hχ(h) is concave, we know that a′ < b′. We then have
∑
i∈I∗\Iˆ hi χ(hi) = a
′D
and
∑
j∈Iˆ\I∗ hj χ(hj) = b
′E. The above inequalities are equivalent to
D
A
V − a′d
m
>
E
B
V − b′d
n
(15)
E
C
V − b′d
n
<
D
C
V − a′d
m
, (16)
Since A < B, D
m
> E
n
and a′ < b′, (15) and (16) are satisfied, which then implies
(13) and (14). This completes the proof.
The second condition in the proposition ensures that scientists with greater
scientific capital hi obtain greater expected payoffs despite increasing opportu-
nity cost per unit time. The existence of a unique risk dominant equilibrium for
more general opportunity costs demonstrates the robustness of the basic model.
3.3 Publishing Partial Results
One of the defining characteristics of academic science is the expectation that
scientists will share information (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Instead of secur-
ing (temporary) property rights over the exploitation of their discovery, as in a
patenting regime, scientists compete for the recognition of their peers (Merton,
1973). In order to secure that recognition, scientists must share their discover-
ies. As a natural consequences of this Open Science norm, scientists grab for
recognition early and often, publishing incremental results that fall well short
of solving a given problem. Here we describe the conditions under which publi-
cation of partial results should obtain.
We assume that the problem P can be broken down into M stages; this
is sometimes called a treasure-hunt game (Banerjee et al., 2014). Each stage
m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} has value Vm and difficulty dm. Stagem+1 cannot be attacked
until stage m has been solved. We assume that each of these stages constitutes
a publishable partial result.
At time 0, all the scientists in I simultaneously decide whether to participate
in stage 1. Scientists can participate in a later stage even without participation
in an earlier stage. When scientist i decides to participate in stage m, she pays
a fixed cost Fm and an opportunity cost of hi x per unit time
4. A scientist is
not required to participate in a subsequent stage m + 1 after participating in
stage m, nor will it always be optimal for her to do so.
When a scientist solves a stage m, she faces an interesting dilemma. She can
publish the solution immediately, guaranteeing that she receives credit for it but
4It may seem unrealistic that we do not require scientists to pay the fixed cost for earlier
stages if they do not participate in those stages. We argue that, in most cases, the size of
the fixed cost is driven by scientists’ uncertainty about the appropriate line of attack; they
must prepare to battle on many fronts. Once the way forward is known, the fixed costs will
be rapidly driven down by standardization and routinization, as the requisite technologies are
black-boxed (Latour, 1987).
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allowing her competitors to catch up. Alternatively, she can keep her results
to herself and begin working on the next stage, gambling the credit that she
could have earned for the first stage in order to improve her chances of winning
the race to solve the next stage. Formally, when a solution to m is published,
every scientist in I knows the solution (whether or not they participated in the
stage). They then decide simultaneously whether to participate in stage m+1.
If a scientist solves stage m+ 1 but chooses not to publish, she can participate
in stage m+ 2 earlier than others. The value of the stage Vm is awarded to the
first scientist to publish the solution, irrespective of who was first to solve it.
We are interested here in the institution of Open Science, characterized by
strategy profiles that lead to immediate publication of any partial result. Given
such strategy profiles, individual strategies that abandon a stage mid-stream
are never optimal and every participating scientist of every stage will always
publish the solution with no delay. We call such a strategy profile a public
sharing strategy profile (PSSP). When a PSSP constitutes an equilibrium (in
the perfect Bayesian sense), we denote it as a public sharing equilibrium (PSE)
(Banerjee et al., 2014).
For stagem, let I∗m = {1, · · · , i
∗
m} where i
∗
m = max{i : V
hi∑
i
j=1 hj
−hi x
dm∑
i
j=1 hj
−
Fm ≥ 0}. Let hI∗m−i =
∑
j∈I∗m,j 6=i
hj . As before, scientists are labeled in de-
scending order of scientific capital hi: h1 ≥ h2 ≥ · · · ≥ hN .
We prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the following condition is satisfied for every pair
of stages (m,m′) such that m precedes m′:
For any i,
VmhI∗m−i
dm
−
hi
dm′
×
Vm′hI∗
m′
−i + xdm′hi
hi + hI∗
m′
−i
≥ 0.
Then the following strategy profile, denoted σ∗, constitutes a PSE: the scientists
play the PSSP in which scientist i always participates in stage m if and only if
i ∈ I∗m; never abandons a stage mid-stream; and always publishes the solution
to a stage without delay. In every stage, the participation decisions in σ∗ are
risk dominant.
Proof Suppose that every agent other than i chooses the PSSP strategy de-
scribed above: agent j participates if j ∈ I∗m, never abandons a stage, and always
publishes the solution to a stage without delay. First, we show that given any
participation decision of i, publishing instantly is a best response. The proof
of this part, which is given below, generalizes the argument by Banerjee et al.
(2014) to an environment with the opportunity cost of time. We adapt the
language of Banerjee et al. (2014) to our setting, but follow their argument and
notation closely.
For notational convenience, we label the m stages in reverse order, such that
the last stage is labeled 1 and the first is labeled m. Let Gik,l, 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤
m, be the subgame where agent i is working on stage k, and all other agents
are working on stage l. Note that because of the property of the exponential
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distribution, it does not matter how much time has elapsed for each agent at
her current stage. Consider two subgames Gik,l and G
i
p,q; if p < k, or p = k and
q < l,
denote the subgame Gip,q as smaller than G
i
k,l. We let R(G
i
k,l) denote the
expected payoff earned by agent i in subgame Gik,l (this corresponds to the
“expected reward” in Banerjee et al. (2014)). Finally, recall that in a subgame
Gik,l with k < l, agent i is already at stage k, while other participating agents
are “behind” in the race and must work on an earlier stage l. We label the
stages {l, l− 1, · · · , k + 1} (i.e., the stages between l and k, including l) as the
captive stages of agent i: these are the stages that i has solved and other agents
have not. We prove the following claim: under the condition specified above,
PSSP is a best response for agent i in every subgame Gik,l, 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ m.
Like Banerjee et al. (2014), we prove the claim by a joint induction on k and
l. The simplest case is one in which i has solved every stage, i.e., the subgame
Gi0,l where i is already at stage 0 and her competitors are at some stage l equal
to or earlier than 0. It is obvious that i’s best response is to publish immediately,
following the public sharing strategy profile (PSSP). In any other subgame, i
has solved some but not all of the stages and is either ahead of her competitors
(k < l, Case I) or tied with them (k = l, Case II). We analyze each case in turn.
Case I: 1 ≤ k < l. Consider a subgame Gik,l and denote its starting time
as t = 0 (in other words, at t = 0, i knows the solution to all stages up to
k and her participating competitors know the solution to all stages up to l).
Assume as our induction hypothesis that PSSP is a best response for agent i
in every smaller game, i.e., for every subgame Gip,q in which p < k, or p = k
and q < l. Consider the case in which agent i instantaneously publishes the
solutions to her captive stages at t = 0, i.e., in which she follows the PSSP.
Upon publication of these solutions, Gik,l reduces to the subgame in which all
participating scientists start at the same stage k, i.e., to the smaller subgame
Gik,k. By assumption, PSSP is the best response for this smaller subgame. Now
consider the case in which i deviates from PSSP, keeping her solutions secret
for a finite amount of time. After an interval τ1 we transition to a different
subgame for one of two reasons: either agent i solves stage k (so we transition
to the smaller subgame Gik−1,l, in which i will play PSSP as her best response by
assumption) or one of her competitors solves stage l and discloses the solution
(so we transition to the smaller subgameGik,l−1, in which i will play PSSP as her
best response by assumption). Recall that playing PSSP for Gik,l would require
immediate publication of all captive stages as soon as the game begins. We
hence consider alternative strategies with the following structure: i commits
to publishing the solution to captive stages after some fixed delay τ > 0, or
publishes the solutions at τ1, whichever comes first. We thus need to show that
i maximizes her expected payoff in the subgame Gik,l by choosing τ = 0, i.e.,
by playing the PSSP. We denote the expected payoff to agent i of delay τ in
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subgame Gik,l as U
i
k,l(τ). The expected payoff to the PSSP (i.e., τ = 0) is
U ik,l(0) =
l∑
u=k+1
Vu +R(G
i
k,k) = Vl +∆+
hi
hi + hI∗
k
−i
(Vk − dx) +R(G
i
k−1,k−1),
where we define ∆ =
∑l−1
j=k+1 Vj . This corresponds to the payoffs for all stages
l to k+1 (denoted ∆) plus the expected payoff in subgame Gik,k. On the other
hand for τ > 0, if there were no opportunity cost of time, delaying publication
until t = τ yields an expected payoff of
Prob(τ1 ≥ τ)(
l∑
u=k+1
Vu +R(G
i
k,k))
+ Prob(τ1 < τ)(
hi
dk
hi
dk
+
hI∗
l
−i
dl
R(Gik−1,l) +
hI∗
l
−i
dl
hi
dk
+
hI∗
l
−i
dl
R(Gik,l−1)),
where
∑l
u=k+1 Vu + R(G
i
k,k) is i’s continuation payoff in the event that no
competitor solves stage l and i does not solve stage k by time t = τ , and
hi
dk
hi
dk
+
h
I∗
l
−i
dl
R(Gik−1,l)+
h
I∗
l
−i
dl
hi
dk
+
h
I∗
l
−i
dl
R(Gik,l−1) is i’s continuation payoff in the event
that i solves stage k or some competitor solves stage l by t = τ . With the
opportunity cost of time, i’s expected payoff must be lower, and hence we have
U ik,l(τ) ≤Prob(τ1 ≥ τ)(
l∑
u=k+1
Vu +R(G
i
k,k))
+ Prob(τ1 < τ)(
hi
dk
hi
dk
+
hI∗
l
−i
dl
R(Gik−1,l) +
hI∗
l
−i
dl
hi
dk
+
hI∗
l
−i
dl
R(Gik,l−1)).
We can rewrite the bounds on the expected payoff U ik,l(τ) in terms similar
to the expected payoff of the PSSP, U ik,l(0):
U ik,l(τ) ≤Prob(τ1 ≥ τ)(Vl +∆+
hi
hi + hI∗
k
−i
(Vk − dx) +R(G
i
k−1,k−1))
+ Prob(τ1 < τ)
hi
dk
hi
dk
+
hI∗
l
−i
dl
(Vl +∆+ Vk +R(G
i
k−1,k−1))
+ Prob(τ1 < τ)
hI∗
l
−i
dl
hi
dk
+
hI∗
l
−i
dl
(∆ +
hi
hi + hI∗
k
−i
(Vk − dx) +R(G
i
k−1,k−1)).
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To compare this payoff with the expected payoff of publishing instantaneously,
we subtract the above expression from U ik,l(0) and have
U ik,l(0)− U
i
k,l(τ) ≥
Prob(τ1 < τ)
hi
dk
+
hI∗
l
−i
dl
(
VlhI∗
l
−i
dl
−
hi
dk
VkhI∗
k
−i + xdkhi
hi + hI∗
k
−i
).
From the condition in the proposition, we have U ik,l(0) − U
i
k,l(τ) ≥ 0 for every
τ > 0. Thus setting τ = 0 maximizes the expected payoff.
Case II: k = l. Assume as our induction hypothesis that PSSP is a best
response for agent i in every smaller game. In this case, the game will transi-
tion to either Gik−1,k (if i solves stage k) or to G
i
k−1,k−1 (if some competitor
solves stage l). In each case, PSSP is a best response for i from the induction
hypothesis. This completes the induction and hence proves the first part.
Next, we show that the participation decision for i as described in the propo-
sition is indeed optimal. Given instantaneous publication by each agent, the
whole game can be treated as M independent games, one for each stage, with
an identical payoff structure to the basic game defined in Section 2. By Proposi-
tion 2, we know that for every such game, I∗m is an equilibrium for participation.
Hence, given that every other scientist j participates in stage m if and only if
j ∈ I∗m, it is optimal for i to use the analogous strategy: participate in stage m
if and only if i ∈ I∗m. Therefore, σ
∗ is a PSE. Finally, Proposition 2 guarantees
that the participation decisions in each stage are risk dominant. This completes
the proof.
The basic intuition behind the PSE is as follows: A scientist will publish her
solution to any stage immediately when (1) the current solved stage is relatively
valuable or easy; (2) there are many competitors and/or competitors with high
scientific capital; (3) she has low scientific capital herself or (4) the opportunity
cost of time is low. Cases (1) - (3) refer to the situation where a bird in the hand
is better than two in the bush: the scientist is incented to publish immediately
and secure the reward before strong competitors catch up, which is a relatively
likely event. In (4), both the expected payoff of publishing immediately and the
expected payoff of holding off increase in the opportunity cost of time, but the
increment of the former is larger.
Example 3 A species of Mycoplasma bacterium previously endemic in migra-
tory songbirds begins to infect domestic ducks and geese. Two microbiologists,
Daniela and Elton, are poised to figure out how this host shift has occurred. The
research process involves two stages: first, large-scale whole genome sequencing
to determine what mutation or mutations made the shift possible; and second,
the molecular biology necessary to work out the biochemical mechanism by which
the mutations act. Daniela has scientific capital h1 = 10 and Elton has scientific
capital h2 = 6. The two stages offer rewards V1 = 60 and V2 = 30 respectively
to the scientist who first publishes the solution, and both have the same difficulty
level d = 15. The opportunity cost per unit scientific capital per unit time for
both scientists is x = 1, while the fixed costs for the two stages are F1 = 1 and
16
F2 = 5. We first obtain I
∗
1 = I
∗
2 = {Daniela, Elton}. It is easy to check that the
condition in Proposition 4 is satisfied for both scientists. Hence, the only PSE
of this game is that both scientists participate in each stage and upon solving
either stage each would immediately publish the results.
But now suppose that fixed costs are slightly higher for the second stage:
F2 = 6. Again both Daniela and Elton will opt to pursue the initial (and highly
rewarding) genomic sequencing stage. Each will publish the results of this stage
immediately. But only Daniela will pursue the mechanistic molecular biology
in the second stage. Thus for this scenario once again I∗1 = {Daniela, Elton},
but now I∗2 = {Daniela}. It is straightforward to check that the condition in
Proposition 4 is satisfied with the new I∗1 , I
∗
2 . Hence, the only PSE of this
game is that both Daniela and Elton participate in stage 1, but only Daniela
participates in stage 2.
The derivation of the sufficient condition for PSE is similar in part to the
argument by Banerjee et al. (2014), but our result differs from theirs in a fun-
damental aspect. In our model, time spent on each stage is costly and scientists
are free to opt in or out for each stage, while in the Banerjee et al. model
the researchers must continue to participate in each stage until the final one
is solved. Consequently, the size and membership of the set of participating
scientists may fluctuate across stages in our PSE σ∗: more scientists will choose
to work on easier stages, while only the best few will stay for the harder stages.
The speed at which different stages are solved may be affected differentially as
well. The harder the stage, the larger the number of scientists who opt out
and thus the longer its solution is delayed compared to the case of compulsory
participation. From a social welfare point of view, this raises a further question
concerning the design of institutions: should the institutional arrangement re-
flected in this multi-stage framework and commonly known as “Open Science”
always be promoted, or is it sometimes more efficient to implement a scheme
where scientists must participate in either every stage or none at all? We will
answer this question in the next section.
3.4 Social Welfare and Efficiency
We consider social welfare as follows: once the problem P is solved, it generates a
constant flow of benefit to society of Vˆ > 0 per unit time5. These benefits could
5 Dasgupta and David (1994) assert that society values “additions to the stock of public
knowledge” (which they dub Science) as distinct from “adding to the stream of rents that
may be derived from possession of...private knowledge” (which they dub Technology). Based
on this analytic distinction, scholars often treat time differently in models of Science versus
models of Technology. According to this view, both society and individual technologists care
about the timing of benefit streams flowing from Technology; hence time is often treated
explicitly in these models. But in the case of Science, individual discoveries are modeled as
benefit shocks and society is modeled as indifferent to the time required to add to the stock of
knowledge. On this assumption, scientists may care a great deal about time-to-discovery, but
this time sensitivity isn’t typically modeled. We will argue that this analytic distinction and
the associated modeling choices distort important aspects of the social function of science.
Most results in basic science generate ongoing benefit flows, and in many cases society cares
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be largely cognitive (e.g., knowing that gravitational waves exist) or eminently
practical (e.g., reducing deaths from AIDS). Society discounts benefit and cost
by rate r, that is, the present value of receiving a benefit V at time t in the
future is equal to V e−rt.
Finally, for publicly funded research, society ultimately bears some of the
fixed costs and therefore there is a social fixed cost Fˆ per participating scien-
tist. Because scientists respond to individual incentives generated by the credit
allocation mechanisms within the field, we do not assume that scientists’ ben-
efits and costs are precisely aligned with those of society (Haldane, 1926). We
leave open the possibilities that (i) scientists may gain prestige, promotions,
and profit by working on problems that are of little value to society and that
(ii) problems of substantial importance to society may be undervalued within
academia. We do assume, however, that once fixed costs are paid, the focal
problem merits solving from society’s perspective: Vˆ
r
− xˆ d > 0.
We can now compute the expected social welfare when the participating
group of scientists is I ′ ∈ I. The flow of benefits to society is equivalent to an
instantaneous benefit of Vˆ
r
at the moment the problem is solved. The expected
social welfare is given by
W (I ′) =
Vˆ
r
∑
j∈I′ hj∑
j∈I′ hj + dr
−
xˆd
∑
j∈I′ hj∑
j∈I′ hj + dr
− |I ′|Fˆ
where |I ′| is the cardinality of I ′. Note that this expression can only achieve a
positive value if Vˆ
r
− xˆ d > 0. In this expression, the first term is the discounted
expected social benefit, the second term is the discounted expected social op-
portunity cost, and the third term is the sum of the fixed costs. By observing
that
∑
j∈I′ hj∑
j∈I′ hj+dr
is increasing in
∑
j∈I′ hj , we know that the socially optimal
participating group, conditional on the group size, is the group consisting of
scientists with the highest scientific capital. Hence, letting Hi =
∑i
j=1 hj, it is
more useful to focus on the expected social welfare from the group {1, · · · , i}:
W (i) =
Vˆ
r
Hi
Hi + dr
−
xˆdHi
Hi + dr
− iFˆ .
The value of social welfare goes to infinity as r goes to 0. However, the
difference between social welfare for two different participating groups has a
finite limit. For instance, consider another participating group of scientists
{1, · · · , i′} with Hi′ units of scientific capital in total; the difference is given by
(
Vˆ
r
− xˆd)
(Hi −Hi′)dr
(Hi + dr)(Hi′ + dr)
− (i− i′)Fˆ .
The limit as r→ 0 is equal to Vˆ d(Hi −Hi′)− (i− i
′)Fˆ .
Let Ie denote the socially optimal participating group, i.e., the group that
maximizes the social welfare. We prove the following proposition:
deeply about the time-to-solution for a problem in basic science. Thus we account directly
for time in the present analysis.
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Proposition 5 The socially optimal participating group is unique: Ie = {1, · · · , ie}
where ie = max{i :W (i)−W (i− 1) ≥ 0}.
Proof It suffices to show that W (i)−W (i− 1) is decreasing in i. Note that
Hi
Hi + dr
−
Hi−1
Hi−1 + dr
=
(Hi −Hi−1)dr
(Hi + dr)(Hi−1 + dr)
=
hidr
(Hi + dr)(Hi−1 + dr)
.
In this expression, hi is decreasing in i, and both Hi and Hi−1 are increasing in
i. Hence, the value of this expression is decreasing in i. Now we have
W (i)−W (i− 1) = (
Vˆ
r
− xˆd)(
Hi
Hi + dr
−
Hi−1
Hi−1 + dr
)− Fˆ ,
which is a linear in Hi
Hi+dr
− Hi−1
Hi−1+dr
. Hence, W (i)−W (i− 1) is decreasing in
i. This completes the proof.
In this setting, both under-participation and over-participation are possible
in general. Rearranging the terms in W (i) − W (i − 1), we can see that the
socially optimal participating group is characterized by the maximum i such
that
Vˆ
r
− xˆd
Fˆ
×
hi
(hi +Hi−1 + dr)(1 +
Hi−1
dr
)
≥ 1.
The first term on the left describes the attractiveness of the problem to society
as a benefit-to-cost ratio; the second term is scientist i’s marginal importance
to society, given that scientists 1, · · · , i− 1 are already participating.
Note that the condition we obtained for determining the risk dominant equi-
librium takes a similar though somewhat simpler form. The unique risk domi-
nant equilibrium is characterized by the maximum i such that
V − xd
F
×
hi
Hi
≥ 1.
The first term on the left is how attractive the problem is to a scientist if she
were to work on it alone; again it is a benefit-to-cost ratio. The second term
is scientist i’s marginal importance, not to society in a cooperative sense, but
to the competition. It is simply evaluated as her own chance of solving the
problem first.
Those studying the norms of science often assert that when a research prob-
lem can be decomposed into stages, it is socially efficient to publish the results
of each stage as soon as they are known (e.g., Merton 1957b; David 2003). By
sharing partial results, the argument goes, the entire community of interested
scientists can begin working on a subsequent stage as soon as the previous stage
is solved. In the context of our model, we might expect that allowing the pub-
lication of partial results will always maximize social efficiency via the PSE.
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But this argument ignores the fact that scientists must decide whether to par-
ticipate in a given stage at all. This decision is endogenous and depends on
the information-sharing strategies of the other players. When partial progress
sharing is allowed, many researchers may choose to drop out of the more diffi-
cult stages and the expected time to solution may increase, to the detriment of
society. We illustrate with an example.
Example 4 Consider the second case of Example 3, in which F2 = 6. Once both
stages are solved, it will be clear how to prevent further infection among domestic
fowl, and thus society will enjoy a benefit of Vˆ = 100 per unit time. The benefit
flow begins when and only when both stages are solved, and is discounted by
rate r = 0.5. The costs for society are assumed to be identical to those for the
scientists: xˆ = 1, Fˆ1 = 1 and Fˆ2 = 6. The general formula to compute social
welfare is
social welfare = E[discounted benefit flow]−E[discounted opportunity cost]−Fˆ1−Fˆ2.
We have shown that with publication of partial results, the unique risk dom-
inant PSE is that Daniela participates in both stages but Elton participates only
in stage 1; and that they will both publish immediately when they have a solu-
tion to either stage. The time to solution of both stages is thus the sum of two
exponential random variables, with rate d
h1+h2
and d
h1
respectively. Hence the
social welfare is equal to 51.03.
Without publication of partial results, if either scientist wants to participate,
he or she has to pay the sum F1 +F2, and will receive a reward of V1 + V2 = 90
if the first to solve both stages. For each scientist, the time to solution is now
a gamma-distributed random variable with shape 2 and scale d
hi
. We can show
that the only equilibrium in this case is that both Daniela and Elton participate
in the whole problem. In this case the social welfare is equal to 55.28. This social
welfare is higher than that obtained with publication of partial results because the
cost of not sharing the solution to the first stage is more than outweighed by the
benefits of having both scientists participate in both stages of the problem.
Here we see that when participation in each stage becomes part of a scien-
tist’s strategic decision, the scientist weighs the expected benefit and cost for
each stage and only opts in for those where she receives a positive net expected
payoff. Consequently, under-participation occurs for hard stages and the over-
all participation level may be lower compared to the case without publication
of partial results. The expected time to solution for the problem as a whole
becomes longer, resulting in lower social welfare. Note the concordance with re-
cent experimental evidence (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2015) showing that regimes
without disclosure of partial results lead to higher levels of participation.
It is useful to contrast our findings with existing theories on patent races.
In patent races, a firm may disclose information before it is able to secure a
patent in order to signal its commitment (as a leader) or move the finish line
(as a follower). Some authors have made the claim that this behavior is always
20
socially desirable (De Fraja, 1993; Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky, 2003), but oth-
ers have noted that once entry and exit are part of a strategic decision, sharing
may not be optimal (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Parchomovsky, 2000; Gill,
2008). The key element leading to suboptimal exit in the latter models is risk
preference: the more risk averse competitors are, the more likely the lagging
ones will exit prematurely, which slows down overall research progress. In our
model, a scientist may publish a partial result in order to secure the credit,
and the exit decision depends on difficulty level, scientific capital, and value;
when an intermediate stage is relatively hard or its value is relatively low, a less
capable scientist opts out. As a result, the complete solution to the problem is
delayed on average.
4 Conclusion
Big new problems arise in scientific communities through several processes.
First, methodological or technological breakthroughs can facilitate new av-
enues of investigation; for example, massive improvements in the ability to
sequence ancient DNA initiated a race to determine the contribution of ar-
chaic hominins such as Neanderthals and Denisovans to the modern human
gene pool (Sankararaman et al., 2014). Second, theoretical advances can raise
empirical possibilities that challenge scientists to develop novel instrumentation
to verify their predictions. For example, Einstein’s theory of general relativity
predicted the existence of gravitational waves; after an initial delay, physicists
spent decades trying numerous approaches for detecting them before the re-
cent success of LIGO (Abbott et al., 2016). Finally, nature herself confronts us
with novel challenges of dramatic societal importance, like the current struggle
to control the spread of Zika virus and ameliorate the harm that it is causing
(Petersen et al., 2016).
Our paper uses game theory to explore how the scientific community re-
sponds to these big problems. We make two contributions to this concrete
question. First, our model robustly predicts that only the top scientists—those
with the most scientific capital—will participate and compete for the solution of
a big new problem. Second, we challenge the conventional assertion that Open
Science with immediate sharing of partial results is always socially efficient. We
show that this is not generically true: if competing in any or all stages of the race
is itself a strategic choice, Open Science may slow down the ultimate solution of
the problem by deterring participation. One major reason that our result differs
from previous work is that we simultaneously model both information sharing
decisions and problem choice, in that we allow the actors in our model to opt
in or opt out of a particular research program.
In doing so, we have proposed a flexible modeling framework for studying
science, within which we can analyze both individual behavior and social effi-
ciency. The framework can be readily extended in many directions. We offer
a few concrete suggestions here: (1) How do scientists choose among multiple
competing big problems? (2) What happens when society values the total stock
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of knowledge rather than a continuing flow of benefits? (3) How would scien-
tists’ behavior change if scientific credit were endogenized, so that the value of
solving a problem depends on the number of individuals also trying to solve it?
(4) How do scientists’ decisions to enter or exit a race change under uncertainty
about its difficulty? (5) What happens when stages of a problem can be solved
in parallel rather than only in sequence? (6) In what contexts can scientists
be incented to sequence their work on interrelated problems to minimize the
total time-to-solution? (7) How do scientists behave in multi-period settings, in
which scientific capital is accumulated across periods? Each of these extensions
increase the realism of the models, with direct implications for science policy.
In the long run we aspire to make policy recommendations based upon such for-
mal analysis rather than simple ad hoc models or, more commonly, qualitative
intuitions, hopes, and prejudices.
Efforts to increase the formal rigor of science policy recommendation are
timely. Federal research budgets are stagnant or contracting, while the very pub-
lic replication crisis (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Camerer et al., 2016)
has shaken both lay and professional confidence in the basic institutions of sci-
ence. One striking positive change is the flourishing literature on the science
of science. Thanks to the unprecedented availability of large-scale electronic
corpora (Evans and Foster, 2011), the last 15 years have witnessed an explo-
sion of large-scales—though often descriptive—quantitative analyses of scien-
tific output (Rosvall and Bergstrom, 2008; Petersen et al., 2011; Wang et al.,
2013; Uzzi et al., 2013; Foster et al., 2015). While these analyses have radically
expanded our positive understanding of the operations of science, the policy pre-
scriptions derived from these empirical projects have limited value. Most do not
persuasively nail down causality, though Budish et al. (2015) and Azoulay et al.
(2013) are exceptions. In general, the field lacks the formal microfoundations
needed for disciplined comparative institutional analysis. And such institutional
analysis is necessary if we are to avoid unintended consequences from hasty or
faddish policy changes.
We aim to provide such microfoundations. As we hint above, this modeling
framework should be rich enough to treat choice, outside options, time, and
partial publication in one setting, mirroring the complexity of scientific institu-
tions and decision-making. The framework should also consistently distinguish
between scientists’ incentives and the social benefits of science, so that we can
model a wide variety of situations. Here we address the most basic problem
confronting scientists: research choice. We focus on the special and socially
consequential case of “big problems.”
Understanding scientific institutions is essential, if science and technology
policy is to help rather than hinder scientists’ capacity to solve specific problems
and produce fundamental insights with unknown but often substantial spillover
benefits. The recent empirical attention lavished on science is a step in the
right direction. But observational and experimental studies can only get so
far without sharpened theoretical tools to guide intuition, direct attention, and
discipline policy implications. The multiplying crises of science constitute a
novel challenge of dramatic social importance. Fixing science may be the next
22
big problem.
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